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EFFECTIVELY PREVENTING POLLUTION AND ECOLOGICAL 
DEGRADATION : THE ROLE OF THE COMMON LAW INTERDICT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION : 
Amongst the fundamental human rights enshrined in South Africa’s 
Constitution1 is the right that everyone enjoys to an environment that is not 
harmful to their health or wellbeing.2  In addition, Section 24(b) places a duty 
upon the State to enact ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’ that 
prevent pollution and ecological degradation.3 
Cheryl Loots in an article published in 1994, prior to the enactment of the 
Constitution (and its predecessor, the interim Constitution4), stated as follows 
in its introduction : 
As the threats to our environment increase the need to use law to protect the 
environment becomes more critical.  South Africa has a considerable body of 
environmental legislation but, generally speaking, it has not been effectively 
enforced.  There are three methods of enforcement : criminal sanction, 
administrative action and civil litigation.  In order to achieve effective enforcement, all 
three methods should be fully utilised.  To date there has been very little 
enforcement by way of either criminal law or civil action.  Insofar as there has been 





Since Loots’s article was published, the South African Government has 
enacted a large number of legislative and other measures in compliance with 
the duty imposed upon it under Section 24(b) of the Constitution, and many 
of these laws are aimed at preventing pollution and ecological degradation of 
the environment.  The question is whether these laws have succeeded in 
effectively preventing pollution and ecological degradation from occurring or 
whether they merely provide remedies once the pollution and ecological 
degradation has occurred.   
                                                    
1
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
2
 Section 24(a). 
3
 Section 24(b)(i). 
4
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
5
 Cheryl Loots, “Making Environmental Law Effective” (1994) 1 South African Journal of Environmental Law and 
Policy (SAJELP) 17. 





In the recently published report on the state of the South African 
environment6 the following is stated in the introduction section of the 
executive summary thereof : 
South Africa has made significant progress in the area of environmental 
management in the past decade.  Despite this, there have been increasing 





This report makes the statement that the condition of the South African 
environment is deteriorating.  The deterioration includes air quality which is 
harming people’s health, water quality and land degradation. 
While the report indicates that environmental management has improved,8 
the fact that these laws and management measures are not effectively 
preventing environmental pollution and ecological degradation begs the 
question as to whether the legislative and other measures enacted by 
Government are effective in preventing environmental pollution and 
ecological degradation. 
This paper will briefly consider some of the laws and management measures 
and their effectiveness in preventing environmental pollution and ecological 
degradation.  This consideration has to be brief, as the array of laws and 
measures and an analysis thereof, could form the subject of a study in its 
own right.  The consideration of these laws and management measures is 
aimed at contextualising the role of the common law interdict in effectively 
preventing environmental pollution and ecological degradation. 
Thereafter, the role of the common law interdict will be considered by looking 
at how the courts, both before and after the enactment of Section 24 of the 
Constitution, have dealt with its elements and how it can, and does, play a 
role in effectively preventing environmental pollution and ecological 
                                                    
6
 South Africa Environment Outlook (2006), A Report on the State of the Environment published by the Department 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2006, available on http://www.deat.gov.za. 
7
 Ibid, executive summary, page 2. 
8
 Ibid. Reference is made in the executive summary to the improvement of some fish stocks which have recovered 
due to good management measures – see at pages 2 and 30. 





degradation, the contention being that prevention must always be more 
effective than the cure.9   
The conclusion reached is that the common law interdict (both final and 
interim) can be used in appropriate circumstances as an effective tool in 
preventing environmental pollution and ecological degradation.  As Loots 
describes it, the interdict is ‘an extremely effective remedy because it puts a 
stop to the harmful activity and therefore prevents altogether, or at least 
limits, damage to the environment’.10 
2. A CONSIDERATION OF LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER 
MANAGEMENT MEASURES 
In order to protect the environmental right, various administrative and judicial 
measures have been enacted.  The main administrative measures are the 
issuing of permits and licences for various activities and the issuing of 
directives for failure to comply therewith or for failing to comply with the 
provisions of the relevant statutes.  The main judicial measures are criminal 
measures comprising some novel sanctions, the introduction of private 
prosecutions and cost recovery provisions while the civil measures 
encompass extended locus standi provisions, the codification of judicial 
review11 and interdicts.  In regard to the civil measures, the issue of locus 
standi and interdicts will be dealt with in the next chapter of this paper. 
A brief overview of the administrative and criminal measures referred to 
above will now be considered. 
The main framework legislation which has been enacted is the National 
Environmental Management Act12 (NEMA), which provides, according to its 
long title, inter alia, for the enforcement of other environmental management 
laws.  It has amongst its principles13 that negative impacts on the 
environment and on people’s environmental rights be anticipated and 
                                                    
9
 See Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd & Another 1996 (3) SA 155 (N) at 169 B - C. 
10
 Loots (supra, note 5) at 27. 
11
 Under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000. 
12
 Act No. 107 of 1998. 
13
 NEMA Section 2. 





prevented, and where they cannot altogether be prevented, be minimized 
and remedied.14 
2.1. Administrative measures : 
The potential impacts on the environment of the listed activities under 
NEMA must be considered, investigated, assessed and reported on to 
the competent authority who must then grant an environmental 
authorisation.15  Every such environmental authorisation must as a 
minimum ensure that adequate provision is made for the ongoing 
management and monitoring of the impacts of the activity on the 
environment throughout the life cycle of the activity.16 
Similarly, provisions are contained in a number of other laws for the 
obtaining of permits, rights and licences prior to the use or activity in 
question being carried out.17 
The object of this system of issuing permits, licences and rights is to 
ensure that prior to the granting thereof, the impact of the relevant 
activities on the environment is considered, investigated and properly 
assessed prior to the competent authority issuing an environmental 
authorisation, a license or a right.  It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to enumerate the provisions of the legislation referred to,18 but suffice 
to say that the legislation referred to contains extensive provisions to 
ensure that the impact of the proposed activity on the environment is 
fully considered and evaluated prior to the authorisation, license or 
right in question being granted. 
                                                    
14
 NEMA Section 2(4)(a)(viii). 
15
 NEMA Section 24(1). 
16
 NEMA Section 24(E). 
17
 See, for example, chapter 4 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 (NWA) which provides for water uses and the 
regulation thereof and for the issue of general authorisations and water use licences; the provisions of chapter 4 of 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) in regard to the issuing of prospecting 
and mining rights; chapter 6 of the MPRDA in regard to the issue of exploration and production rights for offshore 
petroleum and gas; chapter 3 of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 in regard to the granting of various 
categories of fishing rights; the issue of a registration certificate to carry on a scheduled process in terms of the 
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965 which will be replaced by a system of licensing in terms of the 
National Environmental Management : Air Quality Act 39 of 2004. 
18
 Ibid. 





The difficulty with the system of permitting and licensing is that due to 
a lack of capacity, severe backlogs have been formed.  It was recently 
reported that the National Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism has a backlog of 1,075 applications awaiting environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) decisions.19  According to the Department, it 
did not know how far the backlogs dated to and attributed the backlogs 
to a national shortage of EIA officers.20   
2.2. Directives : 
The duty of care set out in Section 28(1) of NEMA is couched in a way 
that deals with two situations, namely, pollution or degradation of the 
environment which has been, or is being caused, on the one hand, 
and pollution or degradation which may be caused (i.e. in the future) 
on the other.  In Bareki NO & Another v Gencor Ltd & Others21 the 
Court held that the provisions of Section 28(1) were not retrospective 
in application while Soltau22 opines that Section 28 applies 
retrospectively and that this is made clear by the use of the phrase 
‘[e]very person who causes, has caused …’.23  Hopefully this 
dichotomy will be resolved when the National Environmental 
Management : Waste Management Bill24 becomes law.  Part 8 of the 
Bill which deals with “Contaminated Land” is expressly retrospective 
inasmuch as Section 41 provides that Part 8 applies to the 
contamination of land even if the contamination occurred before the 
commencement of the Act.  Contamination is defined in Section 1(1)(f) 
as meaning ‘the presence in or under any land … of a substance or 
micro-organism above the concentration which is normally present in 
or under that land which substances directly or indirectly affect or may 
affect the quality of soil or the environment adversely.’ 
                                                    
19
 Article entitled “State grapples with EIA backlog” available on http://www.busrep.co.za/general published on 




 [2006] 2 All SA 392 (T). 
22
 Friedrich Soltau, “The National Environmental Management Act and Liability for Environmental Damage” (1999) 6 




 Government Notice 1832 of 2007, published in Government Gazette No. 29487 dated 12 January 2007. 





In terms of Section 28(1) of NEMA, the person who may cause 
pollution or degradation of the environment is obliged to take 
reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or degradation from 
occurring and, even when the harm to the environment is authorised 
by law or cannot reasonably be avoided, the person concerned is 
obliged to minimize the pollution or degradation.  In this latter respect, 
the provisions of Section 28(1) are clearly aimed at preventing 
environmental pollution and degradation and the duty falls on the 
owner of land or premises, the person in control of land or premises, 
or the person who has the right to use the land or premises in which 
the activity which is likely to cause significant pollution or degradation 
of the environment will occur.25 
The duty to monitor compliance with the duty of care falls on the 
Director General of the Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism (DEAT) and the Provincial Heads of Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism.26  While Loots opines that most of 
the environmental enforcement (at the time of her writing) had been by 
way of administrative action,27 since the enactment of the duty of care 
provisions of NEMA which came into effect on 29 January 1999, it is 
questionable whether the enforcement of this duty of care 
administratively has been effective.   
One of the key outcomes on the report of the state of the 
environment28 is that enforcement of environmental management 
legislation has shown some improvement in areas such as the 
recovery of South Africa’s pelagic fish stocks due to proper 
enforcement of management actions29 but there needs to be a 
willingness and a capacity on the part of the authorities to act against 
                                                    
25
 NEMA Section 28(2). 
26
 NEMA Section 28(4). 
27
 Supra, note 5. 
28
 Supra, note 6, executive summary, introduction at page 2. 
29
 Ibid at page 15. 





perpetrators of environmental pollution and ecological degradation in 
order for these measures to be effective.   
Monitoring and enforcement has received some impetus since June 
2005 with the designation of the first 858 environmental management 
inspectors (EMIs) who are also known as the ‘Green Scorpions’ and 
whose mandate it is to act both locally and at provincial and national 
levels to enforce the new environmental laws and regulations.30  Since 
then a number of significant instances of environmental pollution and 
ecological degradation have been addressed including developers 
who have developed in wetlands without environmental 
authorisations,31 the illegal exportation of rhino horns, ivory and 
abalone,32 and the contravention by a prominent steel manufacturer of 
a number of environmental laws including conducting activities without 
the required environmental authorisations, the dumping of hazardous 
waste on an unpermitted site and particulate emissions to the air that 
have caused serious air pollution.33   
In order for Section 28(1) to be of application, it has to be shown that 
the pollution or degradation of the environment is significant.  In 
Hichange Investments (Pty) Limited v Cape Produce Company (Pty) 
Limited t/a Pelts Products & Others34 the Court held that ‘the 
assessment of what is significant involves, …, a considerable measure 
of subjective import … [and] … that the threshold level of significance 
will not be particularly high’.35  
                                                    
30
 According to enquiries made of Melissa Fourie, Director : Enforcement, Environmental Quality & Protection 
Branch, DEAT, per e-mail on 13.08.2007, approximately another 120 EMIs are currently undergoing EMI Basic 
Training.  In addition 50 EMIs were presented with a 3-day course entitled “Forensics Awareness for EMIs” in 
October 2006. 
31
 Article entitled ‘Green Scorpions crack whip on developers who flout the rules’ available on 
http://www.thestar.co.za/general published on 09.07.07 [Accessed on 23.07.07]. 
32
 Article entitled ‘Rhino horns : two arrested at airport’ available on http://www.dailynews.co.za published on 
11.07.07 [Accessed on 23.07.07]. 
33
 Media statement dated 19.07.07 available at http://www.deat.gov.za [Accessed on 20.07.07]. 
34
 2004 (2) SA 393 (E). 
35
 At page 414 I to 415 A.  See also Jan Glazewski, Environmental Law in South Africa 2ed (2005) 150 and Tracy-
Lynn Field, “Realising the National Environmental Management Act’s potential to bring polluters to book” (2004) 121 
South African Law Journal 772 at 784. 





Section 28(4) of NEMA provides that the Director General of DEAT or 
a Provincial Head of Department may direct any person who fails to 
take the measures required, to do so and Section 28(7) provides that 
should a person fail to comply, or inadequately comply, with such a 
directive, the Director General or a Provincial Head of Department 
may take reasonable measures to remedy the situation and to recover 
all costs incurred from either the person responsible for the pollution, 
the owner of the land, the person in control of the land or a person 
who negligently failed to prevent the pollution or ecological 
degradation from taking place. 
The Hichange case36 is important for the reason that the relief 
ultimately granted by the Court was obtained under the provisions of 
Section 28(12) of NEMA.  Section 28(12) is an important section which 
is not mirrored in any of the other environmental laws referred to37 
other than in the context of invasive species under the Biodiversity 
Act.38  Section 28(12) of NEMA provides that any person may, after 
giving the Director General of DEAT or a Provincial Head of 
Department thirty days’ notice, apply to a competent Court for an order 
directing the Director General or any Provincial Head of Department to 
take any of the steps listed in Section 28(4) (namely to issue an 
appropriate directive), if the Director General or Provincial Head of 
Department fails to inform such person in writing that he or she has 
issued a directive.  As Glazewski states, this essentially creates a 
statutory mandamus giving any person the right to request a Court 
order compelling the listed officials to take action under the sub-
section.  The person entitled to approach the Court is very broad in 
accordance with the broader locus standi provisions both of the 
Constitution and NEMA and gives any concerned individual or non-
governmental organisation the right to approach a Court.39 
                                                    
36
 Supra, note 34.  
37
 Supra note 17. 
38
 National Environmental Management : Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004, Section 74(3). 
39
 Glazewski op cit note 21 at 152; Section 38 of Act 108 of 1996 and Section 32 of Act 107 of 1998. 





Similar administrative actions are available under a number of other 
environmental laws.40  Essentially where any person or entity either 
performs or fails to perform an activity as a result of which the 
environment is either seriously damaged, polluted or degraded, the 
relevant authority is given the power to issue a directive on certain 
terms and conditions to force the person or entity in question to take 
reasonable measures to eliminate, reduce or prevent the damage or 
pollution, and, in the event of the directive not being carried out, the 
authority in question may implement the necessary steps and recover 
all the costs incurred from the person or entity involved. 
Finally, under the Marine Living Resources Act,41 extensive provisions 
are set out for the declaration of marine protected areas to protect 
fauna and flora or a particular species thereof and the physical 
features on which they depend, and to facilitate fishery management 
by protecting spawning stock, allowing stock recovery, enhancing 
stock abundance in adjacent areas and providing pristine communities 
for research.  Provisions are made for activities in marine protected 
areas under permits.  The Act contains provisions prohibiting certain 
fishing methods, fishing gear, bans on driftnet fishing and law 
enforcement including provisions for observers, fishery control officers, 
procedures for taking a seized vessel to port, etc.42 
The duty to enforce these directives falls squarely on the State 
authorities.  The enforcement of environmental law by Government 
departments is seen as a huge problem in South Africa as 
Government officials are incapacitated by a lack of human resources 
and skills.43  The fact that only 858 EMIs have been designated for the 
                                                    
40
 See, for example, Section 31(A) of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989; Section 19 of the National 
Water Act No. 36 of 1998; Sections 69 and 73 of the National Environmental Management : Biodiversity Act 10 of 
2004; Sections 45 and 46 of the MPRDA and Section 45 of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 
(NHRA). 
41
 Act No. 18 of 1998. 
42
 See generally Sections 43 to 60. 
43
 Willemien du Plessis, Hichange – A new direction in environmental matters? – Hichange Investments (Pty) 
Limited v Cape Produce Company (Pty) Limited t/a Pelts Products & Others 2004 (11) SAJELP 135.  





entire country and that only 50 of them have completed a forensics 
training course, only exacerbates matters. 
2.3. Criminal measures : 
All the statutes referred to above make it an offence for a person or 
entity to engage in an activity without the necessary permit, right or 
licence.  In earlier years, the prescribed penalties were inadequate to 
constitute an effective deterrent.  For example, the maximum penalty 
for a first-time offence under the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention 
Act44 is a fine not exceeding R500.00 or imprisonment not exceeding 
six months and in the case of a second or subsequent conviction, to a 
fine not exceeding R2,000.00 or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding one year.45  The effect of such an ineffective penalty is to 
render the incurrence thereof to be simply an expense incurred in the 
conduct of the business.46 
Even statutes with more substantial penalties have not proved to be 
effective deterrents.  For example, Michael Kidd refers to the fact that 
under the Environment Conservation Act there is a provision for a 
maximum penalty of R100,000.00 fine and/or ten years imprisonment 
for certain offences under that Act, but nobody as at the time of his 
article, had as yet been prosecuted in terms of those provisions.47  In 
the more recent laws, more substantial penalties have been provided 
for.48 
The use of criminal law, as Kidd notes, is not without its 
disadvantages.49  The ever present weaknesses are the cost and time 
involved in criminal prosecutions, the fact that it is reactive rather than 
                                                    
44
 Act No. 35 of 1965. 
45
 Section 46. 
46
 Richard J Lazarus, “Assimilating environmental protection into legal rules and the problem with environmental 
crime: (1994) 27 Loyola LA LR 867 at 880 quoted in Michael Kidd, “Environmental Crime – Time for a rethink in 
South Africa?” (1998) 5 SAJELP 186. 
47
 Kidd, op cit at footnote 13.  
48
 For certain offences under the MPRDA fines of up to R500,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten years or 
both are provided for, while under the Marine Living Resources Act fines ranging from R2 to R5 Million for various 
types of offences may be imposed. 
49
 Op cit at 188 et seq. 





preventative in nature, the problems of proof and the obstacles 
presented by “due process” safeguards.  The situation in South Africa, 
he observes,50 are inadequate policing, a lack of public awareness, 
difficulties of investigation and a lack of expertise on the part of the 
court officials.  As he observes, criminal prosecutions involve 
significant cost to the State and there is a considerable time delay 
between the commission of the offence and the conclusion of the trial.  
Because of the need to use expert evidence in certain types of 
pollution trials, costs are higher than in trials dealing with the more 
frequently encountered common-law crimes.  Witnesses are 
inconvenienced by numerous delays and postponements and this 
raises serious questions as to whether it is worthwhile to use the 
criminal process when the best possible outcome from the State’s 
perspective is a trivial fine.  Furthermore, the criminal measures are 
designed to react to offences which have already been committed 
which might often be too late to prevent damage to the environment.  
As such, criminal sanctions are not effective in preventing 
environmental pollution and ecological degradation.  Because of this, 
Kidd suggests that criminal prosecution should be reserved for more 
egregious contraventions of the law.51   
Notwithstanding the reservations expressed above, some novel 
sanctions and other criminal measures have been enacted in NEMA.  
Firstly, provision is made in Section 33 for any person acting in the 
public interest, or in the interest of protecting the environment, to 
institute and conduct a private prosecution of any breach or 
threatened breach of any duty, other than a public duty resting on an 
organ of State, where that duty is concerned with the protection of the 
environment and the breach of that duty is an offence.  Provision is 
also made for the court to order the convicted person to pay the costs 
of the private prosecution.52 




 Op cit at 181. 
52
 NEMA Section 33(3). 





Secondly, various novel criminal sanctions are set out in Section 34 of 
NEMA.  Provision is made for the Court, at the written request of the 
Minister or other organ of State in the presence of the convicted 
person, to enquire summarily and without pleadings into the amount of 
loss or damage which has been caused to the organ of State or other 
person, including the costs incurred or likely to be incurred by an 
organ of State or other person in rehabilitating the environment or 
preventing damage to the environment and for the court to then give 
judgment therefor in favour of the organ of State or other person 
concerned against the convicted person.  Such judgment has the 
same force and effect and is executable as if it had been given in a 
civil action duly instituted before a competent court.53  Furthermore, 
the court may summarily enquire into and assess the monetary value 
of any advantage gained or likely to be gained by such person in 
consequence of the offence committed and, in addition to any other 
punishment imposed in respect of that offence, the court may order an 
award of damages or compensation or a fine equal to the amount so 
assessed.54 
A further novel provision is that the court convicting a person who has 
committed a Schedule 3 offence, may upon the application of the 
prosecutor or other organ of State, order such person to pay the 
reasonable cost incurred by the Public Prosecutor and the organ of 
State concerned in the investigation and prosecution of the offence. 
There are furthermore provisions contained in Section 34 for an 
employer to be guilty of an offence committed by a manager, agent or 
employee under certain circumstances55 and for the manager, agent 
or employee to be convicted as if he or she were the employer under 
certain circumstances.56  Furthermore, a director of a firm at the time 
                                                    
53
 NEMA Sections 34(1) and (2).  It is to be noted that this will only be in the context of an offence listed in Schedule 
3 to NEMA. 
54
 NEMA Section 34(3).  Here too the provision relates only to an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Act. 
55
 NEMA Section 34(5). 
56
 NEMA Section 34(6). 





of the commission by the firm of a Schedule 3 offence, shall himself or 
herself be guilty of the offence and liable on conviction to the penalties 
stipulated in the relevant law including the orders referred to above 
relating to the cost of rehabilitating the environment, a fine equal to 
any economic gain and the costs of the prosecution itself.  As 
Paterson observes, despite being in existence for a number of years, 
these novel penalty provisions remain vastly underutilized.57 
The legislative and management measures set out above are all state 
driven.58  Reference has been made to the limited resources which DEAT 
has in effectively monitoring compliance with the various environmental laws 
and to the backlogs which currently exist in obtaining environmental 
authorisations.  In addition, the courts have also placed limitations on the 
issuing of directives under section 31A.59  In Evans and Others v 
Llandudno/Hout Bay Transitional Metropolitan Substructure and Another,60 
the court held that before being issued with a section 31A directive, the 
applicants were entitled to be given notice of the respondent council’s 
intention to issue a directive under section 31A and be given an opportunity 
of being heard and to make representations thereon to the respondent 
council.61  
Then, in the recent decision of the SCA in HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others,62 the court held 
that before a direction under section 31A could be issued, the issuing 
authority had to comply with the provisions of section 32 which provides, inter 
alia, that before a directive is issued, the authority concerned must first 
publish in the Government or Provincial Gazette a draft notice.  The draft 
                                                    
57
 Alexander Paterson, “Novel financial sanctions for environmental offenders” (2005) December News & Views for 
Magistrates 1. 
58
 Other than the ability of a private person or entity to apply under Section 28(12) of NEMA and Section 74(3) of the 
Biodiversity Act for an order directing the relevant state authority to issue a directive under those Acts.   
59
 Of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989. 
60
 2001 (2) SA 342 (C). 
61
 At 355 D – E. 
62
 SCA Case number 337/06, 28 March 2007, unreported. 





notice is to include the text of the proposed directive and make provision for 
comment thereon.63 
While the requirement in Evans of giving the affected person or entity an 
opportunity to be heard seems to be reflected in the wording of section 28(4) 
of NEMA,64 the wording of section 19(3) of the NWA, sections 69(2) and 
73(3) of the Biodiversity Act, section 45(1) of the MPRDA and section 45(1) 
of the NHRA, similarly to section 31A, do not reflect this requirement.  The 
courts could potentially require the competent authority in terms of these Acts 
to afford the affected person or entity an opportunity to be heard, before it 
can issue a directive especially if one takes into account that section 28(4) of 
NEMA has an over-arching effect on these other provisions.  On the other 
hand, it could be argued that by the Legislature deliberately excluding such a 
requirement from these other provisions, it was clearly intended that it should 
not apply.  Whichever way the courts decide this issue, the effectiveness of 
this environmental protection tool, in the light of the limitations described 
above, is questionable. 
Accordingly, it is argued that the legislative and management measures 
referred to in this chapter are not effective in preventing environmental 
pollution and ecological degradation even though their aim is directed 
towards this objective.  The question, therefore, is whether there is any other 
means to effectively prevent environmental pollution and ecological 
degradation from occurring rather then to rely on measures which by their 
very nature are ex post facto and are designed to remedy environmental 
pollution and ecological degradation after it has occurred. 
3. THE COMMON LAW INTERDICT AS A TOOL FOR EFFECTIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION : 
3.1. Introduction 
If, as postulated above, the legislative and management measures 
contained in South Africa’s various environmental laws are ineffective 
                                                    
63
 At para [13]. 
64
 Which provides for the Director-General or Provincial head of department “after having given adequate 
opportunity to affected persons to inform … of their relevant interests” to issue a directive. 





in preventing environmental pollution and ecological degradation from 
occurring, the question is whether there is any other means to 
effectively prevent this.  An examination of the case law reveals that at 
times, both before and since the advent of South Africa’s 
environmental laws and indeed the enactment of the Constitution, 
interdicts (both final and interim) have been granted and have 
effectively stopped environmental pollution and ecological degradation 
from occurring and continuing.  Kidd opines that : 
An interdict is potentially a very useful enforcement tool because it can be 
used to put a stop to harmful activity and often at an early stage, allowing 
proactive intervention.  An interdict can be sought by anybody, given the 
wide locus standi provisions in NEMA.
65
  (emphasis supplied) 
 
An interdict is an order of court which enjoins a respondent to refrain 
from doing something (a prohibitory interdict) or orders a respondent 
to do something (a mandatory interdict).66  Accordingly, it is not a 
remedy for past conduct, but for present and future conduct.67   
3.2. Locus standi 
Prior to the wide locus standi provisions in NEMA, and the 
Constitution, the issue of locus standi to interdict environmental 
pollution and ecological degradation was fraught with difficulties in that 
the applicant had to allege and prove special damage in order to 
establish the necessary standing to claim the relief sought.68  Now, 
both under the Constitution69 and NEMA,70 any person acting in their 
own or in a group or class of persons’ interests, in the interest of, or on 
behalf of, a person who is unable to act themselves, in the public 
interest and in the interest of protecting the environment, may bring 
interdict proceedings.  Therefore, because of the Constitutional right 
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which everybody enjoys to have an environment that is not harmful to 
their health or wellbeing,71 it is not difficult to imagine that the classes 
of persons now endowed with locus standi, both Constitutionally and 
under NEMA, will effectively get past the previous hurdles in this 
regard. 
3.3. Requirements 
In order to obtain a final interdict, an applicant has to show a clear 
right, an infringement thereof that has actually occurred or is 
reasonably apprehended, and that there is no other adequate 
alternative remedy.72  The requirements for an interim interdict are that 
the applicant must show a prima facie right even though open to some 
doubt, the apprehension of harm which may be irreparable if the 
interdict is not granted, that the balance of convenience favours the 
granting of the interdict and that the applicant has no other satisfactory 
or adequate remedy in the circumstances.73  Each of these 
requirements will now be assessed in the context of environmental 
protection. 
3.4. Clear/prima facie right 
In regard to the first element of an interdict (both final and interim), 
Prest indicates that interdicts are based upon rights and include rights 
based on statute.74  As Claassen J states, ‘[t]he Constitution reigns 
supreme’.75  He also states that by virtue of Section 24 of the 
Constitution, environmental considerations, often ignored in the past, 
have now been given rightful prominence by their inclusion in the 
fundamental bill of rights section of the Constitution76 and that ‘by 
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elevating the environment to a fundamental justiciable human right, 
South Africa has irreversibly embarked on a road, which will lead to 
the goal of obtaining a protected environment …’.77  Accordingly, any 
concerned citizen, association or non-governmental organisation will 
be able to establish both a clear and prima facie right to satisfy the first 
requisites of final and interim interdicts. 
In the past and before the enactment of the Constitution and NEMA, 
reliance was placed, as will be seen below, on the law of nuisance and 
on neighbour law in order to enforce one’s property rights. 
In the environmental context, pollution and ecological degradation 
usually cause harm to neighbouring land owners and thus amount to a 
nuisance to them.  Where the right of one owner to use his property 
conflicts with the right of another owner to the free enjoyment of his 
property, the rights are limited by the imposition of mutual obligations.  
An owner’s rights of ownership then extend only so far as there rests 
an obligation on his neighbour to endure the exercise of that right.  
That involves an obligation on the one owner so as to exercise his 
right that he does not exceed that limit.  If it is exceeded, he no longer 
acts according to the right which his right of ownership accords to him 
and he infringes the right of his neighbour.  That is unlawful conduct 
which the law does not tolerate and which can form the basis of an 
interdict.78  On the other hand, reasonable exercise of a right, i.e. the 
reasonable normal use of the property, is lawful.79 
Thus, in Gien’s case,80 the respondent had erected a scaring 
apparatus on his farm to chase away baboons and other wild animals 
from his vegetable garden and a building that was used as a store.  
The apparatus made loud explosive noises at regular intervals and the 
apparatus was set so as to work night and day.  The applicant’s farm 
joined that of the respondent and the farms were situated in a quiet, 
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rural and well wooded area where cattle farming was mainly carried 
on.  People in the applicant’s house during the daytime as well as the 
night found the explosive noises disturbing and it interrupted their 
sleep.  Applicant’s cattle became restless and the noise affected one 
of the applicant’s horses, which was normally tame, to the extent that 
it threw its rider and could only be calmed down with difficulty.  It 
eventually had to be removed from the farm so that it could be made 
controllable.  The restless cattle caused problems when they had to be 
dipped.  It was technically possible for the respondent to muffle the 
sound of the apparatus by adjusting it without frustrating the purpose 
for which it was erected.  It was also not necessary for the apparatus 
to work at night.  The applicant applied for an interdict against the use 
of the apparatus in a way that it caused a nuisance on the applicant’s 
property and the Court granted an interdict in the applicant’s favour.  
This decision in 1979 long before the advent of many of South Africa’s 
environmental laws, indicates that an interdict for noise pollution of the 
disturbing nature described, based on the law of nuisance, was 
effective.  
In the nuisance section of LAWSA Vol. 19,81 various nuisances are 
listed including odours, noise, smoke, the keeping of animals in 
circumstances where they can cause a material interference with the 
physical comfort of the occupant of neighbouring land, and water 
pollution.  These have all been held to constitute nuisances which can 
be effectively stopped by the obtaining of an interdict.  In paragraph 
211 of the same work, the principles concerning public nuisances are 
set out.  A public nuisance denotes a nuisance of which the harmful 
effect is so extensive as to affect the general public at large or at least 
a distinct class of persons within its field of operation.   
In Dell v The Town Council of Cape Town,82 the traffic manager of the 
Railway applied for an interdict to restrain the defendants from 
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throwing rubbish and other refuse of the Cape Town streets upon the 
beach of Table Bay in the immediate neighbourhood of the city.  De 
Villiers C J stated that ‘[t]here can be no doubt … that the deposit of 
this rubbish is a nuisance to the persons in whose neighbourhood it is 
thrown’.83  In response to the argument by the defendants that the 
applicant did not expressly state that his health was likely to suffer 
from the rubbish being deposited in the neighbourhood of the railway 
station, the judge indicated that the applicant had stated that he was 
employed by the Government as a traffic manager and that 
accordingly the Court could draw the conclusion that his duties would 
compel him to go to both the passenger and goods stations and that 
going to the latter his health would be liable to be affected by the 
stench on the beach.  The judge found that it would be absurd to say 
that the applicant was to wait until his health was affected by the 
nuisance before approaching the Court.84   
The learned judge stated further that –  
If [the applicant] shows to the Court that the probable effect of this nuisance 
would be to injure his health, and if his duties compel him to be in the 
neighbourhood of the nuisance, then I think he has made out a case to 
justify the Court in granting an interdict to restrain the respondents from 
throwing rubbish in his immediate neighbourhood.  Moreover, if this is a 
nuisance, it is a nuisance to the public of Cape Town at large, and Mr Dell, 
as one of the public, according to the authority quoted from Voet, is entitled 
to make this application to restrain the nuisance in any public place in the 
town, and upon any part of this beach in the neighbourhood of the town.  
…[I]t does not follow …, that a private party would not be justified in coming 




The Court accordingly granted an interdict albeit of a limited duration 
akin to an interim interdict allowing the parties to re-approach the 
Court after a period of time for what the Court termed a ‘perpetual 
interdict’.  The law report is annotated to the effect that the nuisance 
complained of was abated by the Town Council and therefore no 
further proceedings were taken.  This is clearly a very early example 
of an interdict abating pollution and ecological degradation long before 
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the environmental laws that the country now has, were even 
contemplated.  In addition, the relief sought was effective in stopping 
and preventing further pollution from occurring. 
What is also apparent from the decision in Dell, is that it is not 
necessary to show actual harm to one’s health and wellbeing and the 
conduct complained of can be interdicted if the potential to affect one’s 
health and wellbeing is demonstrated. 
In Rainbow Chicken Farm (Pty) Limited v Mediterranean Woollen Mills 
(Pty) Limited86 the Court was dealing with a situation where factory 
effluent had been discharged into a stream causing pollution.  The 
Court held that where the producer of effluent discharges it from his 
factory into a public stream, and the effluent thus discharged into the 
stream pollutes it both in the sense that it does not conform to the 
standards laid down in terms of the governing statute (in this instance, 
the 1956 Water Act) and in the sense that it amounts to pollution at 
common law, an injured third party may elect whether to proceed 
against the producer for breach of the statutory duties laid upon him or 
under the common law.87  The Court also found that even if the 
statutory provisions were applicable the victim may still proceed 
against the producer of the effluent under the common law and that it 
would be far-fetched to suggest that a Court could not interdict the 
producer of the effluent from poisoning the public stream.88  The Court 
was dealing on the return day of a rule nisi the effect of which was an 
interim interdict but by the time the parties were back in Court, the 
pollution which had caused the initial application had ceased to exist 
and the Court was only dealing with the issue of costs.  Here too the 
Court long before the advent of South Africa’s environmental laws 
indicated unequivocally that at common law, pollution of a public 
stream could effectively be stopped by interdicting the producer of the 
effluent from discharging the effluent into the public stream.  
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It can thus be seen that in regard to the requirement for both the final 
and interim interdict, whether a person’s right to enjoy his property 
was, or was threatened to be, negatively affected by pollution or some 
other act of ecological degradation, is a factual enquiry much 
dependant on the facts of any given situation.  The cases analysed 
thus far certainly show that on the facts presented therein, the Courts 
unhesitatingly recognized the effectiveness of an interdict in either 
preventing or stopping environmental pollution and ecological 
degradation. 
With the enactment of the environmental right in the Constitution, an 
infringement of that right in a way that constitutes pollution or an act of 
ecological degradation will, even more so than before, be a 
justification for the granting of interdictory relief by the courts. 
3.5. Infringement of the right, or reasonable apprehension thereof 
In the case of both a final and an interim interdict, this requirement 
constitutes a factual enquiry, and the applicant for an interdict will 
have to set out the facts which either constitutes the infringement or 
set out the basis upon which there is a reasonable apprehension that 
the right will be infringed.  The cases discussed below in regard to the 
remaining requirements of the interdict, give a clear indication of how 
the courts have dealt with this requirement. 
3.6. Alternative remedy 
One element of the interdict which is the same whether interim or final 
is the element that there is no suitable alternative remedy.  In Bristow 
v Coleman89 the Court was dealing with an application for an interdict 
by the owner of a ranch to prevent the respondent, a professional 
hunter and safari operator, who had leased the hunting rights on the 
farm from the owner, from issuing hunting rights during the closed 
season.  The Court having found that the applicant had established a 
clear right and that the right was being infringed by the admitted 
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hunting during the closed season, considered whether there was any 
alternative relief available to the applicant other than an interdict.  It 
was suggested by the respondent that there were three alternative 
remedies available to the applicant.  The first of these was to apply to 
the relevant Government Minister in terms of the (then Rhodesian) 
Parks and Wildlife Act 1975, secondly a claim for damages, and thirdly 
a criminal prosecution in terms of the legislation.  The Court held that 
the applicant ‘… is entitled to immediate relief.  There is no knowing 
whether he would be successful in moving the Minister to act or how 
long it would take or whether, if the Minister did act, the notice would 
provide the protection which the [applicant] seeks.’.90   
The Court went on to hold that to sue for damages on each occasion 
when the respondent and his clients killed game was not as suitable a 
remedy as an interdict prohibiting the respondent from infringing the 
applicant’s rights in the future.91  The Court also mentioned the fact 
that the applicant had attempted unsuccessfully to institute 
prosecutions and came to the conclusion that the same reasoning 
would apply in the case of damages.92  
An interdict is a more suitable remedy because otherwise the [applicant] will 
have to wait until his rights have been infringed and he has probably 
suffered loss before, in each case, attempting to institute a prosecution.  





Accordingly, the Court found that the requirement of proving no 
suitable alternative remedy had been established by the applicant and 
granted a final interdict. 
In Wright & Another v Cockin & Others,94 where the respondents had 
stocked their conservancy, which was adjacent to the applicants’ cattle 
farm, with blue wildebeest (which was not endemic to the Eastern 
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Cape), the applicants applied for an interdict prohibiting the 
respondents from allowing any of the wildebeest to come within 1000 
metres of the applicants’ property because the wildebeest had 
transmitted, and would continue to transmit, a fatal virus, known 
colloquially as ‘snotsiekte’.  The respondents had argued that an 
adequate alternative remedy available to the applicants was an action 
for damages.  The Court rejected this argument, pointing out that the 
applicants were faced with a continuous and ongoing situation.  As 
long as the respondents’ wildebeest were allowed to run near to the 
boundary separating their respective properties, it was inevitable that 
the applicants’ cattle would be infected from time to time.  The harm 
was accordingly an ongoing one and there was no way of knowing 
what the scale of the applicants’ losses might be if the mischief was 
not removed.95  The Court therefore concluded that the applicants had 
satisfied all the requirements for a final interdict.96 
In Capital Park Motors CC and Another v Shell South Africa Marketing 
(Pty) Limited and Others97 the first respondent, Shell South Africa and 
one of its franchisees, had erected a filling station without an 
environmental authorisation, as contemplated under the 
Environmental Conservation Act, having been obtained.  The 
respondent subsequently applied for an authorisation which had been 
refused and they thereafter lodged an appeal which was still pending 
at the time the Court was called upon to consider the applicants’ 
interdict.  The filling station had been completed in December 2001 
but trading only commenced in January 2005, some four years later.  
The applicants’ first called for undertakings from the respondents that 
they would desist from operating the filling station but when these 
were not forthcoming, an urgent interdict application was launched. 
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The Court was satisfied that the requirements for an interim interdict 
were satisfied and therefore granted the relief sought.  In considering 
the element of a suitable alternative remedy, the Court held as 
follows : 
It is so that the first applicant might have a claim in delict for damages 
suffered due to respondents’ illegal trading.  That however, is small 
consolation when it is almost impossible to quantify damages sufficiently for 
the loss which may have been sustained over a lengthy period.  There are 
also many other factors that need to be taken into account in quantifying 
damages like for instance, general economic conditions and other local 
conditions.  All these have to be brought into the equation.  In my mind I am 





As set out above, in the environmental context, pollution and 
ecological degradation usually cause harm to neighbouring 
landowners and thus constitute a nuisance to them.  In Three Rivers 
Ratepayers Association and Others v Northern Metropolitan,99 the 
applicants applied for an interdict directing the first respondent to 
remove a group of squatters from a piece of land belonging to the first 
respondent.  The Court, referring to the decision in Regal v African 
Superslate (Pty) Limited,100 stated that when a nuisance is created by 
third parties such as the group of squatters, an interdict is only 
competent if the respondent has knowledge of the nuisance and has 
failed to take reasonably practical measures to prevent the harm.  The 
Court found that the consideration by the first respondent municipality 
of other available land for the second respondent group of squatters 
was a display of reasonableness vis-à-vis the second respondent, 
whereas the law required the measures to be reasonably practical 
vis - à-vis the applicants in an attempt to avert the interference with 
their rights.   
The Court also found that the first respondent municipality was in 
control of the land on which the second respondent group of squatters 
were squatting unlawfully and as such creating a public nuisance 
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which infringed on the rights of the applicants.  The Court accordingly 
found that the first respondent had failed to take reasonably practical 
measures to avert the infringement of the applicant’s rights and 
granted a mandatory interdict directing the first respondent 
municipality to, within forty-eight hours from the grant of the order, 
evict and remove the second respondent group of squatters from its 
property.  
This is yet another example of the effectiveness of the interdict 
remedy as the pollution and environmental degradation which the 
group of squatters were causing on the land in question was 
effectively stopped notwithstanding the fact that the municipal 
authorities were cognisant of the pollution and environmental 
degradation which was occurring and had not done anything effective 
to stop it from continuing. 
An interesting decision dealing with not only the element of 
demonstrating no other suitable remedy but also the ineffectiveness of 
administrative action is the case of Minister of Health v Drums and 
Pails Reconditioning CC t/a Village Drums and Pails.101  In this case, 
the applicant applied for an interdict prohibiting the respondent from 
carrying on with a chemical waste incineration process in 
contravention of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (APPA).102  
The respondent had erected an incinerator on its premises prior to 
making an application for a provisional registration certificate for the 
incinerator as was required in terms of APPA.  Even though the 
respondent was not issued with the requisite registration certificate, it 
used the incinerator on occasions.  The drums which were incinerated 
contained various substances such as residues of paint and chemicals 
which, when subjected to the incineration process, caused chemical 
oxidation resulting in the emission of noxious and offensive gasses as 
defined in Schedule 2 to APPA.   
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On the question of alternative remedies, the respondent argued that 
the applicant had available the penal provisions of APPA and further 
an alternative remedy was available in terms of the National Building 
Regulations and Building Standards Act103 in terms of which an 
application could be made to the Magistrate’s Court for an order to 
demolish any illegally erected structure.104  The Court was not 
persuaded by both these arguments indicating that the fact that APPA 
makes provision by way of a criminal sanction for the respondent’s 
alleged contravention of APPA, was no bar to the granting of the 
interdict.105  The Court also found that the alternative remedy argued 
on behalf of the respondent in terms of Section 21 of the National 
Building Regulations and Building Standards Act did not avail itself to 
the applicant as the Minister referred to in the relevant section under 
that Act was the Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology and not 
the applicant.  The Court rejected the argument on the basis that it 
was ‘ill-founded’.106  The Court accordingly granted a final interdict 
restraining the respondent from carrying on with any chemical waste 
incineration in contravention of the provisions of APPA. 
3.7. Balance of Convenience 
In the context of interim interdicts, there is the further requirement that 
the applicant has to satisfy and that is that the balance of convenience 
favours the granting of the interim interdict.  It is in regard to this 
particular element that difficulties in the environmental context can 
arise. 
The balance of convenience is described by Prest107 as follows :  
In exercising its discretion the Court weighs, inter alia, the prejudice to the 
applicant if the interdict is withheld, against the prejudice to the respondent if 
it is granted.  If there is greater possible prejudice to the respondent, an 
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interim interdict will be refused whereas if the prejudice to the respondent 




The essence of the balance of convenience is to try and assess which 
of the parties will be least seriously inconvenienced by being 
compelled to endure what may prove to be a temporary injustice until 
the just answer can be found at the end of a trial.109 
In the Capital Park Motors case110 the Court found that the balance of 
convenience favoured the applicant.  The respondent had not 
operated the facility for almost four years, and ‘[a]lthough it is a costly 
exercise, the Respondents are the architects of their own 
misfortune.’.111  The Court also found that the first respondent (Shell 
South Africa) – 
… being a big national corporation and part of an international group of 
companies, should be able to hold out for a while longer.  On the other 
hand, First Applicant is a small entity and would in all likelihood find it 




In the environmental context, where one is dealing with the situation of 
pollution or ecological degradation usually on the part of one 
landowner towards another, for example, the emission of noxious 
fumes from an activity or the polluting of a water course,113 in the 
weighing up of the balance of convenience it is likely that a Court will 
find in favour of an applicant where the temporary cessation of the 
cause of the pollution until proper permitting or adequate safeguards 
to prevent the pollution are put in place, can effectively be achieved. 
There are, however, problems when an individual attempts to stop a 
public entity from environmental pollution or ecological degradation.  In 
these instances, it would appear that based on the traditional 
principles which have evolved in our law, the balance of convenience 
will always turn in favour of the public entity. 
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In Verstappen’s case,114 the Court had to consider the balance of 
convenience between a private citizen and a public entity.  The facts, 
briefly, were as follows : the applicant was the co-owner of certain 
immovable property which abutted a worked-out quarry which the first 
respondent (the Port Edward Town Board) had commenced using as 
a waste disposal site.  It had done so without obtaining the requisite 
permit under the Environment Conservation Act.115  The Court found 
that this conduct on the part of the first respondent was unlawful.  The 
Court, inter alia, was called upon to determine whether the first 
respondent should be interdicted from continuing to operate the waste 
disposal site pending the hearing by oral evidence of the nuisance 
created by the waste disposal site.  In weighing up the question of the 
balance of convenience, the Court referred to the decision in Olympic 
Passenger Service (Pty) Ltd v Ramlagan116 where it was held that ‘a 
Court will not grant an interdict if the effects of the order upon the 
respondent or the general public welfare would be to cause greater 
harm or inconvenience from that which the applicant complains of.’117   
The Court in Verstappen then went on to hold that : 
Where, as in this case, the wider general public is affected, the convenience 
of the public must take into account any assessment of the balance of 
convenience. …  In my opinion, if the interests of the other rate payers living 
in the (first) respondents local authority area are taken into account, the 
balance of convenience in this matter is overwhelmingly against the grant of 




The question is whether this finding, which was made prior to the 
enactment of the Constitution and on the principles of nuisance and 
neighbour law, would be any different now that one’s right to an 
environment which is not harmful to one’s health and wellbeing is 
enshrined as a fundamental right in the Constitution?   
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In Hoffman v City of Cape Town & Another,119 on the return date of an 
earlier rule nisi and interim interdict, the Court by agreement between 
the parties, declared that the first respondent (the City of Cape Town) 
was not operating its solid waste disposal facility at Vissershok (the 
City’s largest and most important solid waste disposal facility) in 
compliance with the requirements of the permit issued to it in terms of 
Section 20 of the Environment Conservation Act and that its conduct 
was unlawful.  The Court also ordered the first respondent to bring its 
operation of the facility into substantial compliance with the permit by 1 
September 2006.  In fact, in earlier litigation concerning the first 
respondent’s operation of the facility, it transpired during December 
2004 that the land on which the facility was being operated had not 
been zoned for the purpose of operating a solid waste disposal 
facility.120 
Notwithstanding the unlawful operation of the solid waste disposal 
facility at Vissershok, both applicants chose not to seek interim 
interdictory relief pending the obtaining of the necessary rezoning, 
probably in the light of the decision in Verstappen, but rather chose to 
enforce the permit conditions.  It would be most unlikely that a Court 
would have interdicted the City of Cape Town from continuing to 
operate its Vissershok facility, even though it was unlawful, as the 
interests of the wider community would have taken precedence over 
that of the applicants and therefore the balance of convenience would 
have been overwhelmingly against the granting of such relief to the 
applicants.121 
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In, Fose v Minister of Safety and Security,122 Ackermann J stated as 
follows : 
I have no doubt that this Court has a particular duty to ensure that, within the 
bounds of the Constitution, effective relief be granted for the infringement of 
any of the rights entrenched in it.  In our context, an appropriate remedy 
must mean an effective remedy, for without effective remedies for breach, 
the values underlying and the rights entrenched in the Constitution cannot 
properly be upheld or enhanced.  Particularly in a country where so few 
have the means to enforce their rights through the Courts, it is essential that 
on those occasions when the legal process does establish that an 
infringement of an entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated.  
The Courts have a particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to 
‘forge new tools’ and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this 
goal.
123
  (emphasis supplied) 
 
The Court in Verstappen applied what can be termed a traditional 
approach to the determination of the balance of convenience test.  
The traditional approach would determine that the interest of the wider 
community would outweigh those of an individual even though the 
individual’s Constitutional right to an environment which is not harmful 
to the individual’s health and wellbeing was being negatively infringed, 
and the interdict would be refused.  Surely the Courts are, in the words 
of Ackermann J in Fose, enjoined to forge new tools and shape 
innovative remedies and develop the balance of convenience element 
of an interim interdict differently when it involves environmental issues 
in the private vs. public arena?  Not to do so would effectively exclude 
the common law interim interdict as an effective remedy, as suggested 
by Ackermann J was needed when granting relief for an infringement 
of an entrenched Constitutional right.124 
As indicated above, pollution in various forms on the part of a 
landowner can cause a nuisance to his neighbour’s ability to use and 
enjoy his property.  Prest125 indicates that it is not easy to determine 
the extent of the influence of English law on the South African law in 
regard to the balance of convenience as a factor to be considered in 
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the grant or refusal of an interim interdict.  Section 39(1) of the 
Constitution enjoins a Court in developing the common law to have 
regard, inter alia, to international law.  Inasmuch as the English law of 
nuisance has had some influence on the South African law of 
nuisance, it is appropriate to have regard to recent developments in 
English law in regard to the balance of convenience test. 
In Miller & Another v Jackson & Another,126 the Court of appeal 
considered the granting of an interdict in a matter involving the 
common law of nuisance and was called upon to balance the interest 
of the public with those of a private individual. 
The facts of this case were as follows : from 1905 onwards, cricket 
was played by a village cricket club on a small ground in the village 
thereby becoming an important centre of village life during the summer 
months.  In 1972 a housing estate was built on a field adjoining the 
cricket ground.  The plaintiffs bought one of the houses on the edge of 
the ground and their garden was only 102 feet from the centre of the 
pitch.  While there was a six foot high concrete wall dividing the 
ground from the garden, cricket balls still landed in the garden and 
some even hit the plaintiffs’ house, damaging brickwork and tiles.  
Complaints to the cricket club led to them erecting a galvanised chain-
link fence on top of the wall making the entire wall and fence 14 feet 9 
inches high.  The club also told the batsmen to try and drive the cricket 
balls low for four runs and not to hit them up in the air for sixes.  
Despite these measures, five balls landed in the plaintiffs’ garden, one 
of which just missed breaking a window of a room in which their young 
son was sitting.  The club offered to supply and fit a safety net over the 
plaintiffs’ garden when cricket was in progress, to remedy any damage 
and to pay any expenses, and to fit unbreakable glass in the windows 
and provide shutters and safeguards for them.  The plaintiffs’ rejected 
all these offers and instead brought an action against the club claiming 
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damages for negligence and nuisance, as well as an injunction127 to 
restrain the club from playing cricket on the ground without first taking 
adequate steps to prevent balls being struck out of ground onto the 
plaintiffs’ property.  At the trial, the club conceded that, as long as 
cricket was played on the ground, there was no way in which it could 
stop balls going onto the plaintiffs’ premises occasionally.  The club 
denied that its use of the cricket ground involved an unreasonable 
interference with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their own property and 
contended that it had taken, or offered to take, all reasonable steps to 
protect the plaintiffs and their property from harm.  They were granted 
an injunction and the club appealed.  The appeal was upheld. 
The three Law Lords who heard the appeal had to balance the right of 
the club to continue playing cricket on their cricket ground against the 
right of the adjoining property owner not to have his right to his 
peaceful enjoyment of his property interfered with.  Lord Denning MR 
found that  - 
On taking the balance, I would give priority to the right of the cricket club to 
continue playing cricket on the ground, as they have done for the last 70 





He also said the following – 
This case is new.  It should be approached on principles applicable to 
modern conditions.  There is a contest here between the interest of the 
public at large and the interest of a private individual.  The public interest lies 
in protecting the environment by preserving our playing fields in the face of 
mounting development, and by enabling our youth to enjoy all the benefits of 
outdoor games, such as cricket and football.  The private interest lies in 
securing the privacy of his home and garden without intrusion or 
interference by anyone.  In deciding between these two conflicting interests, 
it must be remembered that it is not a question of damages.  …  As between 
their conflicting interests, I am of the opinion that the public interest should 
prevail over the private interest.  The cricket club should not be driven out.  
In my opinion, the right exercise of discretion is to refuse an injunction; and, 
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On the other hand, Geoffrey Lane LJ held a different opinion when 
balancing the interests of the public with that of an individual and 
stated that – 
A balance has to be maintained between on the one hand the rights of the 
individual to enjoy his house and garden without the threat of damage and 
on the other hand the rights of the public in general or a neighbour to 
engage in lawful pastimes.  Difficult questions may sometimes arise when 
the defendants’ activities are offensive to the senses, for example by way of 
noise.  Where, as here, the damage or potential damage is physical the 
answer is more simple.  There is, subject to what appears hereafter, no 
excuse I can see which exonerates the defendants from liability in nuisance 




On the issue of granting an injunction, he said the following : 
There is no doubt that if cricket is played damage will be done to the 
plaintiffs’ tiles or windows or both.  There is a not inconsiderable danger that 
if they or their son or their guests spend anytime in the garden during the 
weekend afternoons in the summer they may be hit by a cricket ball.  So 
long as this situation exists it seems to me that damages cannot be said to 
provide an adequate form of relief. …  I would accordingly uphold the grant 
of the injunction to restrain the defendants from committing nuisance.  
However, I would postpone the operation of the injunction for 12 months to 




A few years later, the Court of Appeal was called upon, once again, to 
balance the interests of the public with those of a private individual in 
Kennaway v Thompson & Another.132  The facts of this case were as 
follows : 
The plaintiff owned land near a lake on which a club had organised 
motorboat races and waterskiing since the early 1960s.  Although 
aware of the club’s racing activities, the plaintiff began building on her 
land in 1969, considering that the club’s activities would not interfere 
with her comfort and enjoyment of the new house.  However, by the 
time the house was completed in 1972, the club was holding 
considerably more race meetings and the competing boats had 
become more powerful and noisy.  By 1977 the club had become a 
centre for motorboat racing at club, national and international level, 
and the number of days on which racing and practicing took place on 
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the lake had increased.  The plaintiff sought an injunction restraining 
the club from causing or permitting excessive noise to come onto her 
land and restricting motorboat racing on the lake to certain specified 
times.  The trial judge found that a nuisance had been caused by the 
club’s activities on the lake but refused to grant an injunction on the 
ground that to do so would be oppressive, having regard to the 
enjoyment of the large numbers of the public who attended the club’s 
races.  Instead the Court awarded the plaintiff damages.  The plaintiff 
appealed the judge’s refusal to grant the injunction, contending that 
once she had proved that the club had caused a nuisance (which was 
conceded by the club) which interfered in a substantial and intolerable 
way with the use and enjoyment of her property, she was entitled to an 
injunction to stop the nuisance.  The Court of Appeal held that while 
the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction restraining all of the club’s 
activities, she was entitled to an injunction restraining the club from 
carrying on those activities which caused a nuisance to her in the 
enjoyment and use of her property, despite the public interest in those 
activities.  
Lawton LJ, referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the old 
case of Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co.133 and referred 
to the following passage which he described as ‘much-quoted’ – 
… [T]he Court of Chancery has repudiated the notion that the Legislature 
intended to turn that Court into a tribunal for legalising wrongful acts; or in 
other words, the Court has always protested against the notion that it ought 
to allow a wrong to continue simply because the wrongdoer is able and 
willing to pay for the injury he may inflict.  Neither has the circumstance that 
the wrongdoer is in some sense a public benefactor (e.g., a gas or water 
company or a sewer authority) ever been considered a sufficient reason for 





He then remarked that : 
The injury to the plaintiff’s legal rights is not small; it is not capable of being 
estimated in terms of money save in the way that the Judge tried to make an 
estimate, namely, by affixing a figure for the diminution of the value of the 
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plaintiff’s house because of the prospect of a continuing nuisance; and the 




After considering the refusal of an injunction in Miller v Jackson 
(supra), he stated that – 
The statement of Lord Denning MR that the public interest should prevail 
over the private interest runs counter to the principles enunciated in 
Shelfer’s case and does not accord with the reasoning of Cumming-Bruce 
LJ for refusing an injunction.  We are of the opinion that there is nothing in 
Miller v Jackson, binding on us, which qualifies what was decided in Shelfer.  
…  It follows that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction and that the Judge 
misdirected himself in law in adjudging that the appropriate remedy for her 
was an award of damages under Lord Cairn’s Act.  But she was only entitled 
to an injunction restraining the club from activities which caused a nuisance, 




Accordingly he found that – 
Intervention by injunction is only justified when the irritating noise causes 
inconvenience beyond what other occupiers in the neighbourhood can be 
expected to bear.  The question is whether the neighbour is using his 
property reasonably, having regard to the fact that he has a neighbour.  The 
neighbour who is complaining must remember, too, that the other man can 
use his property in a reasonable way and there must be a measure of ‘give 




In Factortame Ltd & Others v Secretary of State for Transport (No 
2)138 the House of Lords (HL) was confronted with the quandary of not 
being able to grant an injunction against an organ of State according 
to UK law.  The HL referred to the European Court of Justice which 
held that when a national court of a member country, in considering a 
matter concerning the rights of an individual protected by a 
Community law, considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it 
from granting interim relief was a rule of the national law like the one in 
the UK in terms of which a State organ could not be interdicted, then 
such rule must be set aside.  The existing registration of the 
Appellant’s fishing vessels was affected by a new law and this would 
have a devastating effect on their business which could even result in 
their bankruptcy.  Following the European Court of Justice’s ruling, the 
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HL granted an injunction in favour of the Appellant effectively 
suspending the application of the statute pending a review thereof.  
In weighing up the balance of convenience between the private and 
public interest, Lord Bridge of Harwich said – 
A decision to grant or withhold interim relief in the protection of disputed 
rights at a time when the merits of the dispute cannot be finally resolved 
must always involve an element of risk.  If, in the end, the claimant succeeds 
in a case where interim relief has been refused, he will have suffered an 
injustice.  If, in the end, he fails in a case where interim relief has been 
granted, injustice will have been done to the other party.  …  [T]he Court 
shall choose the course which, in all the circumstances, appears to offer the 
best prospect that eventual injustice will be avoided or minimised. 
 
If the applicants were to succeed after refusal of interim relief, the 
irreparable damage they would have suffered would be very great.  That is 
now beyond dispute.  On the other hand, if they failed after a grant of interim 
relief, there would have been a substantial detriment to the public interest 
resulting from the diversion of a very significant part of the British quota of 
controlled stocks of fish from those who ought in law to enjoy it to others 
having no right to it.  In either case, if the final decision did not accord with 
the interim decision, there would have been an undoubted injustice.  But the 





Lord Goff of Chieveley said – 
Turning then to the balance of convenience, it is necessary in cases in 
which a party is a public authority performing duties to the public that ‘one 
must look at the balance of convenience more widely, and take into account 
the interests of the public in general to whom these duties are owed.’  …  In 
this context, particular stress should be placed on the importance of 
upholding the law of the land, in the public interest, bearing in mind the need 
for stability in our society, and a duty placed on certain authorities to enforce 
the law in the public interest.  This is of itself an important factor to be 




I have, on all the material available to your Lordships, formed the same 
opinion as that formed by Neill LJ in the Divisional Court on the material 
then before him, that there was not sufficient to outweigh the obvious and 
immediate damage which would continue to be caused if no interim relief 




From these decisions, one can distil the recognition, in the English 
context, that the rights of the Davids against the Goliaths of this world 
will be protected by means of an interdict even in instances where, 
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traditionally, the balance of convenience would have favoured the 
Goliaths.  Recalling the words of Claassen J in the BP case,142 that ‘by 
elevating the environment to a fundamental justiciable human right, 
South Africa has irreversibly embarked on a road, which will lead to 
the goal of obtaining a protected environment …’, this seems to echo 
the sentiments expressed by Ntusi Mbodla143 where he states that the 
South African Courts are beginning to regard the environment as 
having intrinsic value and he goes on to quote from the words of 
Blackmun J of the USA144 - 
But this is not ordinary, run-of-the-mill litigation.  This case poses – if only 
we choose to acknowledge and reach them – significant aspects of a wide, 
growing, and disturbing problem, that is, the Nation’s and the world’s 
deteriorating environment with its resulting ecological disturbances.  Must 
our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that we render 
ourselves helpless when the existing methods and traditional concepts do 
not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate for new issues? 
 
These developments in the traditional law of nuisance, would, 
arguably, find application in the environmental context and it is argued 
should be used to develop our common law interdict remedy so that in 
situations like Verstappen, the nuisance created by the local authority 
in unlawfully using a worked-out quarry as a landfill site could be 
effectively stopped, albeit on an interim basis, pending a proper 
environmental impact assessment being carried out prior to obtaining 
the necessary permit to do so.  The conditions of such permit would in 
all likelihood take into account those factors which constitute a 
nuisance to the neighbours whose properties abut the worked-out 
quarry and in this way, rather than a simple refusal of interim relief on 
a traditional approach, an effective environmental management tool in 
the form of an interim interdict would be forged. 
The balance of convenience in the traditional sense will need to be 
reconsidered by our Courts (as has occurred in England) and they will 
have to reshape this particular element of an interim interdict in order 
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to make it effective in the private vs. public context.  This is particularly 
more so when weighing up an effective precautionary measure 
against other relief which by its nature will be ex post facto, such as 
damages.  An award of damages does not always bring effective relief 
as the Court found in Kennaway v Thomson (supra) and in appropriate 
cases an interim interdict preventing continuing harm and 
environmental degradation may be more effective. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to prevent environmental pollution and ecological degradation, an 
array of administrative and criminal measures have been enacted.  How 
effective these measures have been, is questionable, especially if regard is 
had to what has been reported in the South African Environment Outlook,145 
that despite the enactment of these measures, the South African 
environment is deteriorating. 
In chapter 2, these administrative and criminal measures were briefly 
considered.  It was seen that they are State driven and that as a result of 
incapacity and being under resourced, substantial backlogs have arisen.  
Monitoring compliance and enforcement of these measures have, until 
recently with the designation of the first 858 EMIs in June 2005, been 
inadequate.  In addition, the courts have placed limitations on the issuing of 
administrative directives particularly under section 31A of the Environment 
Conservation Act. 
In regard to criminal measures, notwithstanding substantial increases in 
penalties and the introduction of novel sanctions, they remain underutilized.  
Inadequate policing and investigation, and a lack of expertise on the part of 
the court officials, are given as reasons for this.  Furthermore, criminal 
prosecutions are reactive rather than preventative in nature and the delays in 
concluding the criminal prosecution very often means that the damage to the 
environmental has already occurred.  As such, criminal sanctions are not 
effective in preventing environmental pollution and ecological degradation. 
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On the other hand, the analysis in chapter 3 of the cases in which interdicts 
(both interim and final) were sought and granted in an environmental context, 
has demonstrated that the common law interdict has been, and can be, used 
as an effective tool in preventing environmental pollution and ecological 
degradation and the use of this remedy to effectively prevent pollution and 
ecological degradation from occurring, is to be encouraged.   
However, where the environmental rights of applicants are being infringed or 
threatened by a public entity, a modified and redeveloped balance of 
convenience test needs to be forged by the Courts.  Not to do so, and to 
continue to apply the traditional approach to the balance of convenience test 
in such contexts will lead to the common law interim interdict losing its 
effectiveness as a tool to prevent environmental pollution and ecological 
degradation from occurring. 
oooOOOooo 
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